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Marten van Heuven  
Where will NATO be ten years from now ? 
1. Introduction 
This might seem like an innocent question, hardly worth much attention in 
the midst of NATO's fiftieth birthday celebrations. It implies that NATO 
will be around a decade hence. It suggests that, like people, NATO will 
grow naturally more mature and, hopefully, more respected. It assumes that 
prediction is possible. We should know better. So let us look again.
1 
NATO is a bundle of commitments, efforts and procedures agreed upon by 
a growing number of countries over the past half century to safeguard their 
vital interests. It now faces a world marked by accelerating change, in 
which everyone is connected but nobody is in charge.
2 Its utility as a tool to 
serve the security interests of its members—demonstrated with resounding 
success during the Cold War—is not a given in the current age of transition 
and globalization. So the title question is serious. It deserves a serious 
answer. This answer will not be predictive.
3 No one can tell where NATO 
will be ten years from now. However, it is possible to build an estimative 
assessment. Such an assessment can examine key variables and identify so-
called drivers. This approach can lead to an appreciation of the factors that 
 
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Ambassador Robert Hunter, 
recently United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, and 
of Samuel F. Wells, Associate Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center, 
Washington, DC. 
2 The phrase is Thomas L. Friedman’s, in “Left Behind as the Globalization Train 
Speeds Up,” International Herald Tribune, February 3, 1999, p. 6. Marten van Heuven 
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will influence the future of NATO, key events that may determine its 
course and, hopefully, policy choices on the road ahead. 
This paper will not, however, go into the question whether one possible 
scenario is more—or less—likely than another. To be sure, the official 
world of estimative intelligence usually does make such an effort.
4 In this 
paper, however, there is neither the time nor the space to apply probability 
analysis to the many issues making up this complex subject. 
2. Variables 
One key variable is membership in NATO. The next decade is likely to see 
further growth, so that by 2010, NATO membership will have grown 
beyond nineteen. Slovenia and possibly Romania might be members. So 
could Austria, if it overcomes its preoccupation with neutrality. Bulgaria is 
a possible wild card. More speculatively yet, there might be room for the 
Baltics, though under arrangements involving less than full membership 
and enjoying Russian acquiescence if not support. A growing NATO would 
be demonstratively open to more members. Such a NATO would be 
viewed by members and nonmembers alike as the principal organization 
for European security. Partnership for Peace would be a precursor for 
potential new members. Such an evolution would leave plenty of scope for 
a key American role in European security. 
There are other scenarios. One is that by 2010, NATO may have no more 
members than it did at the end of 1999. The contrast between the rhetoric 
of an open door and the reality of frozen membership would keep alive—if 
not exacerbate—the current picture of insiders and outsiders and, worse, 
leave the impression of a new division. This division would not be bridged 
 
3 Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein are variously credited with the comment that 
prediction is difficult, especially about the future. 
4 In recent years, the National Intelligence Council has revived the practice of 
assigning probabilities, and doing so by percentages rather than the use of words 
such as “unlikely,” “possible,” “even,” and “probable.” See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 
“Peering into the Future,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, p. 82. Where will NATO be ten years from now ? 
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by Partnership for Peace, which could come to be seen as a second-level 
security tier, or even a no-man's-land. Another scenario is that this division 
could be bridged by Partnership for Peace if East Central European 
countries saw that as what they really need. 
Furthermore, the enlargement process of the European Union (EU) might 
have gathered steam, with a larger EU and more effective security and 
defense cooperation among the European members of NATO. Thus, by 
2010 there could be a stronger European Pillar of NATO, posing the issue 
for the United States of how best to deal with this evolution. Alternatively, 
European countries could be handling security issues more actively outside 
the NATO process, facing the United States with the difficult issue of how 
and how much to engage, on which issues, and with whom. However, 
regardless of progress by EU countries toward their goal of a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security and Defense Identity, 
the EU in 2010 is not likely to have taken the place of NATO as the most 
relevant and effective security organization in Europe. 
An EU that is more effective in security affairs in 2010 might allow 
Washington to accommodate itself to—and over time even come to like—
the more even distribution of tasks and responsibilities it has long called 
for. But it may be too much to expect any substantial readjustment of the 
respective American and European roles within NATO without friction. 
The United States will not find it easy to change its ways—if not the view 
of its proper role—and a greater European role could accentuate 
differences among the European NATO members. 
Another variable is tasks. Historically, NATO has moved from defense to 
deterrence, then detonate, and now cooperation. NATO tasks in 2010 may 
contain elements of all of these. One scenario is NATO involved in 
peacekeeping operations in its vicinity (i.e., out-of-area). Another is heavy 
NATO peace enforcement in the Balkans. Yet another would have NATO 
engaged in security-enhancing activities in and beyond the periphery of 
Europe, perhaps simultaneously in more than one geographic area. A more 
serious scenario would have NATO coping with an Article V threat against 
one or more members, or perhaps a Partner for Peace country scheduled to Marten van Heuven 
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become a member. A cataclysmic scenario would have NATO defend 
against an attack by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, any 
comprehensive analysis must make room for a scenario in which NATO 
simply does not act. 
The NATO strategy of cooperation raises the important issue of relations 
with Russia. Hopes early in the nineties for a determined turn from Soviet 
communism to parliamentary democracy and a free market economy have 
been overtaken by a confusing reality and uncertain prospects.
5 Amidst the 
uncertainty about Russia's direction there are few moorings for a reliable 
estimate. By 2010, Russia could have moved in many directions, even if 
not precisely those scripted by The Economist. A vast country with a large 
population, and subject to internal stress, Russia's future will be shaped by 
many factors, some of which may not be discernible today. Yet some 
estimative judgments may be warranted. 
First, Russia's evolution will be shaped by Russians from within. Not that 
external factors—interface with the West and with the rest of the world—
won't count. A purposeful Western policy of cooperation will remain 
important to help Russia reform and to meet the sensitive issue of Russia's 
perception of itself as a world power. But Western cooperation will be 
validated only to the degree reform takes hold from within Russia. Second, 
Russia's need for reform will create some form of dependency on the West, 
creating mutual incentives for cooperation. Third, Russia will be mindful of 
its large Eastern neighbor, and China's aspirations. This is another possible 
incentive for cooperation with the West.
6 
 
5 The Economist sketched what it called “Four faces of a Primakovian Russia,” along 
two axes, from competent to incompetent, and from nice to nasty. The optimistic 
view saw Russia as Poland (on the whole, competent and nice). Three pessimistic 
views, however, likened a future Russia variously to Ukraine (nice but 
incompetent), China (competent but nasty), or Congo (nasty and incompetent). The 
Economist, March 13, 1999, p. 59. 
6 According to Brzezinsky, however, this possibility must be regarded with caution. 
“Moreover, Russia has still to make its fundamental geostrategic choice regarding 
its relationship with America. Is it a friend or foe? It may well feel that it has major 
options on the Eurasian continent in that regard. Much depends on how its internal 
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There is one other factor. By 2010, Russia may have regained its military 
strength. This possibility reinforces the advisability of a Western policy of 
cooperation now. The institutional context of this cooperation may be 
principally in advanced forms of today's institutions: the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and—
beyond NATO—the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and the United Nations Security Council. Chances are, however, that the 
next decade will see the creation of yet other institutional arrangements to 
meet the needs of the moment. So the institutional context may change. 
The objective of cooperation will not. Whatever the range of NATO tasks 
by 2010, their focus will be on the spectre of new threats. Some of these 
threats are already on the horizon. They are the product of technical 
innovation and possible destructive behavior, terrorism in particular. The 
NATO of 2010 will, in addition, be deep into issues of infrastructure 
defense on land, in the atmosphere, and in space. Missile defense could be 
prominent on NATO's agenda. 
NATO involvement and potential action in 2010 will be shaped by the 
solidarity of NATO members in the face of common challenges. During the 
Cold War, the Soviet threat produced basic cohesion among the allies 
under American leadership. By 2010, however, a direct relationship 
between threat and cohesion may no longer exist. For example, use of 
WMD against a NATO member might well trigger a divisive debate on the 
nature of the response, with adverse consequences for NATO cohesion. 
When German Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer recently suggested that 
NATO consider adopting a no-first-use policy, the alliance members kept a 
stiff upper lip. But this issue is not off the table, and the episode suggests 
how divisive it can still be. 
A third variable is organization and leadership. As to organization, the 
differences between 2010 and today will be not so much in the size of the 
NATO family as in the way it operates. NATO members and Partners for 
 
politics evolve and especially on whether Russia becomes a European democracy or 
a Eurasian empire again.” Zbigniew Brzezinsky, The Grand Chessboard, 1997, p. 
44. Marten van Heuven 
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Peace today comprise forty-three countries. This total will not be much 
different in 2010. But new patterns of interaction will have evolved. One 
possible pattern would show a clear division of commitments and practices 
between members on the one hand and Partners for Peace on the other. 
Members would caucus and plan, as now, among themselves—within the 
integrated military command—about how to maintain stability and security 
in Europe. Nonmembers would be part of a more extended pattern of 
discussion and consultation on a selection of Partnership for Peace issues 
outside the context of the obligations of Articles IV and V of the 
Washington Treaty. A more likely pattern would reflect a blurring line 
between members, members-to-be, and Partners for Peace. In such a 
scenario, distinctions as to commitments among members and with respect 
to nonmembers would be gradual, not sharp.
7 Also, in this scenario most if 
not all European countries would play a part in a pattern of security 
cooperation in parallel with cooperation in other areas in the context of a 
widening European Union. 
Each pattern of interdependence raises the issue of leadership. In Europe, 
one country could emerge as a natural leader. The candidate for such a role 
is Germany. Germany's many assets would give weight to such a role—its 
size, location, economic strength, and its military capacity. However, by 
2010 Germany may not have fulfilled the promise of internal cohesion 
implied by unification. Also, the toll of coalition politics may be an 
obstacle to effective leadership. Furthermore, any perceived strong German 
role in Europe is likely to trigger a common reaction from the rest of 
Europe. France could play such a role only when its European partners 
 
7 On March 24, 1999, in the middle of the Kosovo crisis, NATO Secretary General 
Javier Solana wrote to the Prime Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Slovenia, and the President of Macedonia, to reiterate NATO’s support for the 
territorial integrity of their countries, to emphasize that any Yugoslav threat to the 
security of these countries would be unacceptable, and to underscore that the 
Alliance would view any attack on them with the utmost seriousness. In contrast to 
the attention given on both sides of the Atlantic to the issue whether NATO should 
extend its commitments by taking in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as 
new members, this expression of NATO commitments received virtually no public 
notice. Where will NATO be ten years from now ? 
9 
became convinced that France was pursuing European rather than national 
French objectives. European leadership in 2010 will therefore more likely 
emerge from the interaction of the larger countries. The effectiveness of 
smaller countries will depend on their ability to join efforts. 
The American interest in a stable, democratic, and prosperous Europe will 
in 2010 be the foundation of a willingness to continue to play a leadership 
role in maintaining European security. NATO will be the instrument of 
choice. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any other organization, present or 
future, that could command the loyalty and US domestic political support 
as does NATO. Most likely, by 2010 the United States will still be working 
its way through the dilemma how to share a leadership role in NATO with 
European allies who carry more responsibility.
8 Budgetary constraints and 
the press of global responsibilities will, however, nudge the United States 
in this direction. Much will depend on the degree of American confidence 
in the ability of the "European Pillar" to pursue policies in NATO that are 
seen as broad lying support—and not in derogation—of American interests. 
Finally, a key variable will be the resources that European NATO members 
will be committing to NATO in 2010. The picture today shows American 
forces superior to those of its NATO allies. This situation will not change 
much in a decade, though European leaders understand the correlation 
between military capability and the ability to influence regional if not 
global affairs.
9 By 2010, force disparities will continue to make an 
American role in European security—and in NATO—significant if not 
indispensable. 
 
8 This is the theme in David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee (eds.), America and 
Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1997. For a speculative essay on what a new 
division of labor along these lines would look like, see Marten van Heuven and 
Gregory F. Treverton, Europe and America: How Will the U.S. Adjust to the New 
Partnership, RAND, IP-171, 1998. Congressional disinclination except in crisis 
situations to focus on Europe, if it persists, remains an important element in this 
mix. 
9 For the argument that Europe should create the military strength to create a 
partnership of equals, see James A. Thomson, “A European Defense Identity Would 
Bolster NATO,” International Herald Tribune, February 19, 1999, pp. 6-20. Marten van Heuven 
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3. Drivers 
Five sets of issues will drive the condition of NATO in 2010. First, the 
threats. Some may be old-fashioned, affecting or directed at the territorial 
integrity of members of the NATO family, on NATO's eastern border and 
in Turkey. NATO's challenge will be not so much the capacity to meet 
these threats as the will to do so. Other threats will be new, asymmetric, 
directed at populations and infrastructure, and possibly of indeterminate 
origin: Kosovo presents a variant of these new threats. NATO is using 
force against a European country in an effort to deal with large-scale 
human rights violations that are regarded by the Alliance as so serious as to 
constitute a threat against both the interests and the values of the NATO 
community. These new threats will occupy a large part of the NATO 
agenda and will pose the challenge of fashioning effective strategies. Still 
other threats will come from beyond the NATO periphery, such as from 
instability in the Gulf and the Maghreb, forcing the out-of-area issue, and 
raising the question for the United States of where European roles and 
responsibilities give way to American engagement with global issues 
beyond the comfort of NATO alliance arrangements. 
Second, the evolution of Russia. In its current transition, Russia has but 
limited ability to affect global events. Furthermore, an unstable Russia 
would make for an unstable Europe. However, a Russia that is focused 
forward on reform rather than backward on lost empire, and that cooperates 
with NATO, will be an indispensable and positive factor in European 
security. This should be the continuing objective of NATO policy. 
Third, the state of the European Pillar in NATO. This will be shaped by the 
way European members of NATO manage the issue of European stability 
and cope with the range of threats in and on the periphery of Europe. It will 
depend also on the way the European members of NATO handle the 
leadership issue, and in particular what role Germany will play and whether 
this role will be accepted by the other components of the pillar. 
Fourth, the American commitment to NATO. It will be present, but 
Washington will have to spread its resources to fulfill a global role in the 
Middle East, the Gulf, the Pacific, and in Latin America. America will Where will NATO be ten years from now ? 
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want a stable and strong Europe. By 2010 it may be more accustomed than 
it is now to sharing decision making.
10 
Fifth, the state of the global economy. Security cooperation is difficult, 
even in good times. Economic stagnation, however, would decidedly create 
an unfavorable climate for security cooperation, Serious economic 
imbalances would trigger beggar-thy-neighbor policies that would impede 
effective defense cooperation and security policies in general. 
Last, cataclysmic events which, were they to occur, would fundamentally 
change the outlook for European security and for NATO. The use of 
nuclear weapons near or against Europe would have severe but incalculable 
effects. An energy crisis could drive a wedge between Europe and the 
United States. A health disaster caused by inadvertent or intentional 
environmental pollution would have unpredictable but serious effects on 
the cohesion of the alliance. 
4. Interests 
In a period of profound change it is crucial to be clear about interests. The 
American debate following the end of the Cold War has been but sporadic. 
Where it has not led into blind alleys,
11 it has produced meager results. A 
recent Council on Foreign Relations effort could agree unanimously only 
on physical defense of United States territory as an American vital 
interest.
12 The Commission on America's National Interests, however, 
booked some success. With respect to Europe, it agreed on three vital 
interests: That there be no new hegemonic threat to Europe, that the 
 
10 On this issue, see America and Europe. 
11 Administration terms of “democratic engagement” and “new world order” have 
failed to leave permanent marks. So have academic efforts, such as the term “epoch 
of mutualism.” See Hugh DeSantis, Beyond Progress, 1996. 
12 Council on Foreign Relations Project on U.S. National Interests After the Cold War, 
1994-1995. Marten van Heuven 
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European allies survive as free and prosperous states, and that NATO 
continue as a powerful political-military alliance.
13 
The discussion in Europe has also been less than satisfactory, focusing on 
"architecture" and employment policies. In France, the discussion has 
zeroed in on the objective of countering perceived American hegemony. 
The notion of a hegemonic America resonates oddly with anyone familiar 
with the effort to get American domestic political support for a barely 
adequate funding level for the conduct of foreign policy in the post-Cold 
War period. American political leaders talk a lot about leadership, but 
Washington is profoundly aware of the need for allies and draws on long 
and mature experience with the process of alliance consultations. 
The European Commission has also been far from clear. Its rhetoric has 
been a jumble of interests and principles, laced with references to threats 
and power, wrapped around the notion that Europe must become more 
active in external relations in response to "growing calls" from its citizens 
for greater unity.
14 This is an odd statement coming from an organization in 
which the drive for unity has been top down rather than bottom up. The 
flabbiness of the discussion about interests on both sides of the Atlantic 
notwithstanding, there are several interests that could be served by NATO 
in 2010. One surely is the incorporation of East Central European countries 
into European political, security, economic, and social structures. Without 
some encompassing framework of unity, there will not be order in Europe. 
Another is to provide a framework for the German Question. A post-Cold 
War united and sovereign Germany will fit better into a European order 
that features a continuing, albeit reduced, American presence within the 
 
13 On a global scale, what the Commission called “Blue Chips” are five: (1) Prevent, 
deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on 
the United States, (2) Prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or 
Asia, (3) Prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders or in 
control of the seas, (4) Prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems: 
trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and environmental, and (5) Ensure the 
survival of U.S. allies. Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 1996. 
14 Agenda 2000, DOC/97/6, 28, July 15, 1997, p. 28. Where will NATO be ten years from now ? 
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framework of a common security structure. A third interest is a more 
inclusive, cohesive, and capable European Union. In this respect, the 
NATO interest is not in the grand schemes of an "ever closer Union" but in 
the more urgent business of bringing the countries of East Central Europe 
into this structure of European order.
15 This should be the priority, not the 
perfection of relationships among the current members of the European 
Union, important as that task may be. 
5. Values 
Interests, to paraphrase Lord Palmerston, tend to remain more or less the 
same. Interests of the members of NATO will continue to differ in 2010 as 
they do today. But throughout the history of NATO there has been a 
commonality of values. It is these factors that make NATO attractive to 
members and nonmembers alike.
16 It is a common interest of all members 
of the alliance—present and future—to promote those core values of 
freedom, common heritage and civilization, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and peace. What will hold 
NATO together in 2010 is the inherent logic of European Atlantic 
cooperation based on these values. 
6. Use of Force 
Even with basic agreement on values, the issue of the use of force by 
NATO will be as difficult in 2010 as it is now. During the Cold War, 
deterrence was based on political unity, military readiness, and an 
American nuclear guarantee. NATO's policy was to respond to any 
territorial threat in a manner and place of its own choosing. The American 
 
15 “The main danger to the future of Europe lies in the post-communist East, and that 
should be Europe’s priority.” Robert L. Hutchings, “Rediscovering the National 
Interest in American Foreign Policy,” Working Paper, The Woodrow Wilson 
Center, Washington, D.C., March 1996, p. 7. 
16 See also the recommendations in “NATO in the 21st Century,” North Atlantic 
Assembly GEN(98)3, rev. 1, October 1998. Marten van Heuven 
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commitment was firm, and regarded as such. The rhetorical question 
whether the United States would place its cities at risk to defend Germany 
remained theoretical. That policy worked. 
In 2010, the commitments of the NATO members will be based on the 
same provisions of the Washington Treaty. The circumstances in which 
these provisions operate, however, will be entirely different. A larger 
NATO will find it harder to reach consensus. Moreover, even an armed 
threat or attack against a NATO member, while sure to set off intensive 
diplomatic activity, will not necessarily lead to a military response. It could 
even lead—paradoxically—to a review of what triggered the threat or 
attack in the first place.
17 In any event, a decision to use military force will 
be highly situation dependent. Different interests among NATO allies 
could produce a military response involving some but not all members of 
the Alliance, perhaps using the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, or 
perhaps simply a coalition of the willing. These considerations do not 
invalidate the essence of the Washington Treaty. They do, however, change 
the nature of deterrence, just as the strategy of deterrence is affected by the 
prospect that some of the threats NATO may face in 2010—such as cyber 
threats—may arise in circumstances in which the identity of the threatener 
is unclear. A key ingredient of deterrence under these new circumstances 
will be leadership of the Alliance and Alliance cohesion.
18 
If deterrence fails, the Alliance will face the issue of how to respond 
effectively. There will be a range of eventualities. One is a threat or an 
armed attack against a member state. Another is a threat or armed attack 
 
17 This is what happened in 1991. At that time, the Turkish government, citing 
perceived territorial threats on its eastern frontier, requested NATO assistance in the 
form of the air element of the ACE Mobile Force. Ultimately, NATO aircraft did go 
to Turkey, but not until the German Bundestag had discussed whether Turkey, by 
its own actions, had brought the threat upon itself. The argument was made that had 
this been the case, the German government would not have agreed to the Turkish 
request. NATO would not have been able to respond. 
18 In Kosovo, the NATO policy of deterrence, while expected to work, did not. NATO 
found itself using force, something it had wanted to avoid. NATO will have to 
reassess deterrence, in particular in contexts of domestic or regional strife in which 
nuclear weapons are clearly not a factor. Where will NATO be ten years from now ? 
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against a prospective member. There is also the possibility of a threat or 
armed attack against a Partner for Peace. Articles 4 and 5 of the 
Washington Treaty commit members only with respect to other members.
19 
However, whether a threatened European country is a member of NATO, a 
prospective member, or a Partner for Peace will not, as such, make a 
decisive difference how the Alliance will respond in 2010. The response 
will be tailored instead by a host of circumstances, including the identity (if 
known) of the attacker, the nature of the threat, the ability to counter it on 
time and in place, and the political/economic/strategic equities at stake. 
7. Conclusion 
In 2010 the Alliance may be faced, as it already has, with a situation in 
which European peace, security, and stability are at risk because of events 
in its neighborhood beyond the territory of its members and Partners for 
Peace, such as in the Balkans. Such a contingency could raise the issues 
whether to employ military force, to what ends, how, with what rules of 
engagement, and for what period. No amount of scenario writing ahead of 
time will adequately equip the NATO of 2010 with ready-made prescrip-
 
19 Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides: “The Parties will consult together 
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” Article 5 states, in 
part: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right 
of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic Area.” It should be noted, moreover, that when NATO established 
Partnership for Peace, it included in its invitation a provision to the effect that 
NATO would consult with any active participant in the partnership if that partner 
perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or 
security. Thus, as early as 1994, NATO created a formal obligation to consult with 
partners, with an implied indication that such consultation could trigger NATO 
action—diplomatic, political, economic, or perhaps even military—in case of a 
threat to the vital interests of a partner. Marten van Heuven 
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tions. NATO policies will need to be calibrated afresh each time. Whatever 
crises NATO may face in 2010, there will be no escape from the need for a 
hard strategic assessment, and for political decisions whether, and if so 
how, NATO should act, including with respect to the issue of use of force. 
Thus, in 2010, as now, the Alliance will depend on the familiar elements of 
clarity of purpose, leadership, determination, readiness, and cohesion.  
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